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This paper presents an account of the reasons why the so-called German model finds itself in
a serious and persistent crisis. The main point of the paper is that there are powerful long-
term forces changing the structure of the German economy in a way which is at odds with
the egalitarian philosophy of German-style collective wage bargaining and the relevant
provisions of the welfare state. With appropriate qualifications, the point may equally apply
to other European countries with a similarly constructed set of 'corporatist' labour market
institutions.
In essence, the paper is no more than an evaluative survey of arguments that draws heavily on
ideas and pieces of empirical evidence scattered in the relevant literature. It consists of three
parts: section 1 gives a definition of what the term 'crisis' can and should mean with respect to
a system of collective bargaining; section 2 elaborates the main line of reasoning that
underlies the diagnosis of a crisis; and section 3 draws policy conclusions on whether and
possibly how industrial relations and the welfare state could be adjusted to meet the emerging
challenges without a complete dismantling of what is commonly known as the 'German
model'.-2-
1. What Crisis of Collective Bargaining?
Applied to a system or practice of collective wage bargaining, the term crisis may have two
different meanings, a positive and a normative one. In the positive sense, the system is in a
crisis if an ever increasing share of all wage agreements in an economy is concluded outside
the system, i.e., if the system is more and more deserted by its traditional members and/or
bypassed by a fast-growing outsider competition of non-members. In the normative sense, the
system is in a crisis if its very working leads to a persistent violation of some generally
accepted political, economic or social goal which is impossible or at least very costly to
redress by any compensatory policy measures.
In the positive sense, the German bargaining system has been remarkably stable over the
almost half a century of post-World War II labour market history: 1 not only its constituent
legal principles and institutional practices
2, but also its main economic characteristics have
survived quite different unemployment regimes. In its core, the system can be characterized
as a model of regionalized industrial bargaining - involving negotiations and agreements
between the relevant industrial union and employers' association of an industry on a regional
basis, roughly speaking on the level of states ('Lander'). About a quarter of all collective
agreements are concluded on a company basis; on the other hand, some industries like con-
struction and printing have (quasi-)nation-wide agreements. In theory, the existence of
roughly 800 (sectoral and regional) bargaining districts and a large number of company-
specific agreements allows for a high degree of structural wage flexibility, but the long-
standing wage leadership of metal manufacturing in some major bargaining district
(nowadays typically northern Baden-Wurttemberg) has secured a rather uniform growth of
wages across sectors and regions. 3 Hence, though not formally centralized, the German
bargaining system is - and has always been - highly synchronized.
1 With some minor qualifications, most national bargaining systems of continental
European countries remained quite stable over this period. For a rich survey of the
relevant systems and their development over time in all major industrial countries, see the
various contributions in Hartog, Theeuwes [eds., 1993].
2 On these in detail, see Paque [1993a], 214-24.
3 For econometric evidence on the intertemporal stability of the relevant wage structure in
Germany and its rigidity with respect to sectorally and/or regionally concentrated labour
market shocks, see Paque [mimeo] and Burda [mimeo].-3-
Outsider competition to the system has remained very limited in the past: while the share of
union members among employees did never surpass 40 percent over any longer period of
time, it was above all the high degree of organisation among employers that guaranteed a
quite encompassing coverage of the economy with collectively agreed contracts. A rough
guess is that, in western Germany, about two thirds of all employers are members of some
employers' association, and that nine out of ten employees work on terms fixed in some
collective agreement.'* Basically all sectors of the western German economy - with the
exception of parts of retail trade and household (and related) services that employ a
predominantly female labour force - have been covered by collective agreements all over the
post-waft period; thus the distinction between 'unionized' and 'non-unionized' sectors or firms,
which is used in the literature on American labour markets as an analytical means to estimate
'union relative wage effects'^, makes no real sense in the German context.
It is a most remarkable fact that neither the high unemployment in the early 1950s nor the rise
of unemployment in the 1970s and early 1980s and its subsequent persistence at historically
high levels destabilized the system in the sense that many established or new firms found it
profitable to quit or stay out of the employers' associations and hire unemployed persons at
s\ibcontractual wage levels. As there are in principle no major legal obstacles to do this^,
there is at present no real reason to speak of a crisis of collective bargaining in the above
positive sense, at least not for western Germany. For the eastern part of the country after
German unification in 1990, the situation may become somewhat different in due course:
with factual rates of underemployment of 20-30 per cent (including various forms of hidden
unemployment not counted in the official jobless statistics)^, outsider competition may grow
4 See Paque [1993a]; pp. 217, who quotes estimates provided by the federation of German
employers' associations. Note that the statistical basis of these estimates is remarkably
poor: no systematic polls or surveys are conducted on a regular or at least an occasional
basis to verify the numbers.
5 See i.a. Lewis [1986].
6 Under certain restrictive conditions, collective agreements can be extended to third
parties by a declaration of the Federal Minister of Labour (for details, see Paque [1993a],
pp. 218-20). However, there are good reasons to suspect that this legal option, which is in
fact rarely used in practice, was not a decisive threat to be made responsible for the
conspicuous lack of outsider competition. We shall return to this matter below in
Section 3.
7 See Paque [1993b] for various measures of this kind.-4-
into a new dimension and thus a more serious threat to the stability of the system. Recent
polls on the degree of organization of employers and on the frequency of subcontractual
payment practices in eastern Germany seem to support such a conjecture.^ For the time
being, however, this .remains a matter of speculation because the basis of information is still
very shaky.
In any case, a diagnosis of crisis of collective bargaining must be based mainly on normative,
not on positive grounds: while the system is still essentially stable, it may be unable to
prevent or it may even lead to persistent unemployment.
2. Structural Change and Unemployment in the Long Run
The 1980s have undoubtedly been a boom time for research in the causes of unemployment.
In view of the stepwise increase of the unemployment rate that most European countries had
experienced in the (then) recent past, the natural focus of this research lay first on the specific
supply and demand shocks that led to the rise of unemployment and second on the
asymmetric forces that supported its persistence well after the relevant shocks.^ This research
lacked what might be called a historical dimension: usually, the econometric testing grounds
for subjecting the theories to empirical scrutiny were time series stretching back to no earlier
than the 1960s, and cross section and panel data of most recent vintage. The informational
content of the important time series dimension was thus restricted to basically two major
historical events, namely the two oil price hikes in 1973/74 and 1980/81, supplemented by the
respective subsequent recessions in 1974/75 and 1981/83. This rather narrow focus gave the
relevant research a high degree of empirical coherence and theoretical subtlety: crude early
notions of 'Keynesian' demand gaps and 'neoclassical' wage gaps as explanations of
unemployment gave way to more sophisticated theories of shock persistence and hysteresis as
a consequence of physical capital shortage, of insider/outsider-wage determination and of
declining search intensity of long-term unemployed persons.
See DIW, IfW [1994], Table 1. Note, however, that the methodology of these polls does
not ensure their being representative in a strict statistical sense.
A by now classical example of the first type of research is Bruno, Sachs [1985]; major
examples of the second type - among them the seminal papers Blanchard, Summers
[1986] and Lindbeck, Snower [1986] - are reprinted in Cross [ed.,1988] and Lindbeck,
Snower [1988].-5-
On the othe hand, no more fundamental reason in terms of specific long-term trends of
economic growth and structural change were sought for to understand the observed facts. In
our view, this rather narrow focus is most unfortunate because it may stand in the way of a
more comprehensive assessment of the deeper challenge that is associated with the observed
changes of labour market regimes, say, from the 1950s and 1960s to the 1970s and 1980s
(and beyond). In the following subsections, we summarize how such an assessment could
plausibly look like.
(a) The emergence of unemployment
Historically, the perception of unemployment as a well-defined economic phenomenon and as
a social and political problem is closely linked to the twin process of industrialization and
urbanisation. Although it is difficult to identify precise periods of time and geographical
places where unemployment first emerged and was understood in the modern sense of the
term as involuntary idleness, it is probably a good guess to locate its birth in the course of the
19th century in the leading industrializing countries, i.e. in Britain and the United States, and
somewhat later in Germany and its western neighbours France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
A well-known historical case study on the matter (Keyssar [1986]) comes to the
uncontroversial conclusion^ that in the relevant region - the state of Massachusetts -
unemployment in the modern sense became a fact of social life in the course of rapid urban
and industrial growth that took place between, say, the first and the last quarter of the 19th
century. It is worth recalling the reason for the emergence of unemployment in the words of a
prominent economic and social historian:
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, industrial work ... was combined in close
geographic and institutional proximity to domestic work and agriculture. It tended to be done
in small household-based workshops or put out to farmers. Thus, when industrial activity was
slack, industrial workers simply shifted to farm tasks or household maintenance; when
demand picked up, they shifted back to industrial activity. In the course of the century,
however, work moved off the farms and out of the household into factories that were
seperated socially, geographically, and institutionally. When factory work fell off, workers
could not therefore easily shift. They were without a job and finding something else to do
involved a distinct effort, a recognizable period of time and social space. That space came to
be referred to as unemployment. (Piore [1987], p. 1839)
Hence the emergence of unemployment in the modern sense can be traced back to a specific
form of structural change that can best be decribed in a two-sector model of an economy
10 See the approving review by Piore [1987].-6-
consisting of a primary sector ('agriculture') and a secondary sector ('manufacturing'). In this
model of stylized 'industrialization', an (exogenous) technical progress leads to a sharp rise of
capital intensity, of labour productivity and of the wage in the secondary sector. Due to the
specific characteristics of production in that sector, however, the wage rise goes along with a
sharp rise, of the cost of intersectoral mobility that subsequently consist of all pecuniary,
social and psychic costs of geographically moving and personally adjusting from a rural to a
fast growing urban environment. It is the rise of mobility cost that tends to make the
reallocation of labour between the two sectors largely irreversible, a form of definite one-way
migration. While the prospect of a permanently and substantially higher wage in
manufacturing employment makes it profitable for workers to incur the cost of moving from
agriculture to manufacturing, a wave of lay-offs in manufacturing does not lead to a
symmetric movement back to agriculture: in an era of a long-term trend of 'industrialization',
the wave will by definition be a cyclical one so that the workers can expect to be back in
(comparatively well-paid) manufacturing employment within a relatively short period of
time, which they can survive in a state of 'waiting', i.e., of genuine unemployment.
Analytically, one may thus say that unemployment in the modern sense of the term
presupposes the existence of at least one sector that pays relatively high wages and that is
reasonably well separated from the rest of the economy by a barrier of high costs of
intersectoral mobility. As long as this sector does not exist, there can only be an
'underutilization' of labour in the sense that the workers would switch to different, better-paid
jobs if these were available. Even this idea of 'underutilization' has its narrow limits: it is only
sensible if the alternative jobs can realistically be taken to define the standard of normal
employment and the taking of inferior jobs as a temporary deviation; if the 'underutilization'
is permanent, however, it becomes a mere euphemistic description of (relative) poverty. In
fact, with a historical focus on the labour market, one may describe the very process of
industrialization in the 19th century as the transformation of the economy from a state of
'poverty-cum-full employment' into a state of 'prosperity-cum-unemployment', with un-
employment here meaning temporary involuntary idleness. 11
In this respect, there is a strong parallel in the emergence of unemployment between
19th-century Europe and America on the one side and the Third World today on the
other: in developing countries, one can define a sensible concept of unemployment only
for highly urbanized regions, where there is no easy substitution between agricultural and
industrial work. Typically, migrants from rural areas recognize the prospect of well-paid
work in urban centres and thus crowd in the slums of fast growing cities, 'waiting' for the
opportunity of finding a relatively well-paid industrial job. Qualitatively, this is the same-7-
For Germany - as for all other then industrializing countries - most of the 19th century
remains, a statistical blank space with respect to the actual extent of unemployment in the
modern sense. Only for the time from 1887, some information is available, namely figures on
unemployment among union members. They indicate that, by today's standards, full
employment prevailed in Germany at least until World War I, with an average unemployment
rate of union members for 1887-1913 of roughly 2.4 per cent and brief cyclical peaks in two
recessions (1892, 1901) of 6-7 percent. 12 in terms of a 'modern' definition as the share of
unemployed persons in the total labour force, these numbers probably mean an average
unemployment rate of not much more than 1 percent and recession peaks of 3-4 percent,
which comes close to the conditions of the 1960s, the decade generally regarded as the
'golden age of full employment'.^ Hence, while unemployment became a category separable
process that has been going on in 19th-century Europe and America; however, due to its
quantitative dynamics - notably the extremely fast and apparently self-reinforcing pattern
of migration from rural to urban areas- the process seems to lead on average to
somewhat higher equilibrium unemployment rates in the Third World today than was the
case in 19th-century Europe and America. - All this is highly conjectural because the
relevant statistical information is very poor indeed. For an empirical survey of
unemployment in developing countries, see Turnham, Erdcal [1990].
Own calculation with data from Mitchell [1981], p. 175, whose figures are based for
1903-13 on official union statistics published by the Imperial Statistical Office in its
annual yearbooks (Statistisches Reichsamt [various issues]), and for 1887-1903 on
estimates by Kuczynski [1962, p. 260; 1967, p. 315], who also uses union records as the
basis for his calculations. See also Hentschel [1983], p. 104 and Faust [1982], p. 257.
As proxies for the economy-wide unemployment rate, the figures on unemployment
among union members are likely to reflect two biases that pull in opposite directions. The
upward bias: union membership was almost exclusively restricted to the industrial
workforce, which was that part of the labour force with the highest incidence of
unemployment in the modern sense (as argued in the text above). The downward bias:
within the industrial workforce, union membership contained a disproportionately high
share of skilled labour which has usually a lower rate of unemployment than unskilled
labour. Given the still large share of agricultural employment in the German economy at
the outset of the First World War (38 percent in 1913 according to the national accounts
provided by Hoffmann [1965, p.205J), it is reasonable to assume that the upward bias
dominates the downward bias. An estimate by Maddison [1991, Table C 6, p. 260] of
unemployment as a share of the total labour force for Germany in the 1920s (see Table 1
of this paper's appendix) indicates that the unemployment rate of union members usually
overstates that of the total labour force by slightly more than 100 percent. If this isfrom poverty in the course of industrialization of the German economy, it remained for the
time being a purely cyclical phenomenon, with no traces of persistence over longer periods. 14
Why was this so? From a bird's-eye view, a combination of two reasons stands out. First,
there were only very modest systems of unemployment insurance which were run by various
unions for their members and partly subsidized on a rather small scale by some local
governments. While they provided a bare minimum of short-term emergency aid to alleviate
the effects of unemployment on living standards, they did certainly not lay the economic
ground for any extended phases of job search. Hence, quickly finding a job after having been
laid off remained of existential importance for the vast majority of workers. 15 Second, the
forces of structural change as driven by the income elasticities of product demand, technical
progress and newly emerging patterns of international trade were pulled in a direction which
favoured a smooth labour market adjustment. Notably the fast trend growth of employment in
industry at the expense of (low-productivity) agriculture and, within industry, of high-
productivity branches like iron and steel, metal manufacturing, electrical engineering and the
chemical industry ensured that structural change proceeded 'voluntarily': workers - skilled and
unskilled ones - who were forced to change jobs via a spell of unemployment were likely to
find rather soon a better paid alternative somewhere else in the economy. In this respect,
assumed to hold for imperial times as well, the relevant average unemployment rate was
roughly 1 percent.
Despite the statistical lacunae, casual historical evidence indicates that this statement is
also true for the two decades before 1887. After the 'Griinderzeitboom' following German
unification, there was a sharp business downturn in the mid-1870s, which led to a hefty
increase of emigration and, according to one very crude estimate, to a rise of the
unemployment rate up to 20 per cent (Mottek [1966], p. 102). However, time series data
on unemployment of selected groups of union members (notably printers) indicates that,
by 1880, unemployment had apparently reached more or less the level that is known from
the time after 1887; other indicators point into the same direction. For details, See
Kuczynski [1962], pp. 262-3.
On union-run unemployment insurance schemes in imperial times, see Risch [1983], pp.
176-196. Although the schemes varied greatly between different unions with respect to
contribution and benefit rules, they were all very modest by modern standards. Official
union statistics show that, in the decade 1904-13, roughly one half of all unemployed
union members received benefits; in the same period, the average duration of a completed
spell of unemployment was about 17 days, with very little variation over time. (Own cal-
culations with data from Statistisches Reichsamt, various issues).-9-
industrial growth led to a potential revaluation of the labour force that could be transformed
into wage increases by a competitive labour demand pull, even without resort to collective
bargaining whichstill played only a minor role in wage determination.
(b) Collective bargaining and unemployment insurance
The interwar-pcriod brought two important institutional innovations: collective wage
bargaining and eompulsary unemployment insurance. The decisive 'displacement effect' from
a basically free labour market to a collective bargaining system on a broad scale took place
with the First World War, but the organisational roots on the union and the employers' side
can be traced back to the 1890s, partly even back to the 1860s. 16 During the first half of the
1920s, the legal framework and the 'culture' of today's industry-based bargaining took shape.
Although most unions were still crafts-based, major branches of industry adopted a factual
industry-organisation of the labour side in bargaining. E.g., metal workers, who at times
made up 30 percent of all union members in the Weimar republic, were organized in the
'German Metal Workers Union' (the predecessor of the IG Metall and already at the time the
largest single industrial union in the world), which was founded in 1891 as an industrial union
and carried out its collective bargaining consistently on an industrial basis. The backbone of
this union (as of all others) were skilled workers, who made up about 2/3 of the membership,
but actual negotiations covered all skill groups (including unskilled and semi-skilled
workers). Formally, there were still many different crafts associations or unions within any
industry, but they were usually united under special cartel arrangements (e.g. in the branches
related to metal manufacturing the so-called 'Mctallkartell') which delegated their right to
conclude collective agreements to the relevant 'leading' industrial union (e.g., the German
Metal Workers Union). 17 Hence the eventual formal move from crafts-based to industry-
based unions, which took place after World War II, was not anymore of fundamental
economic importance as a step towards more encompassing organization of collective
bargaining in the sense popularized by Olson [1965, 1982]A%
On the development of collective bargaining in imperial times, see Moses [1982], Vol. I.
On the structure of organisation of metal workers, see Hartwich [1967], pp. 65-72.
See Paque [1994], pp. 11-26 for a detailed discussion of the 'Olson-thesis' that there was
a deep institutional break concerning the influence of interest groups between the German
economy of the 1920s and that of the 1950s. As to collective bargaining, the only major
institutional innovation after World War II was the removal of compulsory arbitration as
the last resort of solving a bargaining conflict, which was part of the Weimar labour-10-
A state-run compulsory unemployment insurance was introduced by law in 1927. Although
the structure of benefits has been repeatedly adjusted in detail, the. basic construction
principles of this insurance have remained unchanged until today (disregarding, of course, the
Nazi period): on the contribution side, levying a payroll tax to be financed half by employer
and half by the employee, with the government standing ready as a lender of last resort in
case of high deficits; on the benefit side, payment of a specified share of the terminal net
wage - depending above all on the person's family status, but usually well above 50 percent -
for a limited period - at the time of its introduction 26 weeks, with the option of receiving
support beyond that on a means-tested basis according to standard welfare criteria.19
In view of the persistent growth of industrial employment that had been going on for some
decades, these institutional innovations appeared to be well justified on economic grounds.
With the benefit of hindsight, an economic case for their introduction at the time could read
like the following paragraphs.
[i] Collective bargaining. Broadly speaking, theory and empirical evidence suggest that
German-style collective bargaining involves two departures from wage setting in a
free labour market, namely a greater monopolistic rent due to cartelization (the
'union wage effect') and a greater market power of employed insiders vis-a-vis
unemployed outsiders (the 'group membership effect').2O The union wage effect
involves social costs in terms of lower employment and, ceteris paribus, higher
unemployment levels compared to a free labour market. In turn, the group
membership effect may involve benefits or costs in terms of employment because it
tends to increase the persistence of (non-anticipated) exogenous shocks to the labour
market constitution (and, in fact, used quite often in practice). Whether the relatively bad
industrial relations of the 1920s were the cause or the consequence of the poor record of
compulsory arbitrations remains a matter of controversy which deserves more economic
research. For a detailed historical account of the system's working, see Bdhr [1989].
For details on the system at the time of its introduction and on adjustments in later
decades, see Hentschel [1983], pp. 111-118,198-201.
The first effect receives its theoretical rationale from standard monopoly union models
(see Farber [1986], Oswald [1986]), the second one from insider/outsider-models (see
i.a. Blanchard, Summers [1986], Lindbeck, Snower [1986]).-11-
market, which-may be positive or negative.^! In view of the four-decade long
experience of fast growth of industrial employment at the expense of agriculture
(i.e. the 'voluntary' structural change from a low- to a high-wage sector), an
economic observer towards the end of imperial times (equipped with modern
theory!) might have reasonably argued in favour of introducing collective
bargaining: 'anticipating' a continuation of the pattern observed in the past, he/she
would have assumed that the future would bring again a positive stochastic trend
(i.e. a random walk with upward drift)22 of industrial employment whose labour
market effect would be made persistent precisely via collective bargaining which
transformed outsiders (notably former agricultural workers) into insiders. Given the
observed size of the positive shocks in the past, this type of benefit may well have
been conceived as overcompensating the employment cost of a union monopoly
rent.
[HJ Unemployment insurance. Similarly, a more generous provision of unemployment
benefits may have been viewed as a reasonable means to bring the length and
breadth of average job search closer to a social optimum: under the anticipated
circumstances of long-term structural change from (low-wage) agriculture to (high-
wage) manufacturing, but cyclical fluctuations of industrial employment, a more
thorough and careful evaluation of emerging job options by temporarily
unemployed persons was not unlikely to bring a social benefit in terms of a greater
efficiency of labour reallocations that would outweigh the cost of longer average
unemployment spells.
Up to the present, there have been basically three distinct historical testing periods for these
two major pillars of the German labour market institutions, the time of the Weimar republic
(excluding the years of Nazi rule), the post-war period up to 1973 and the last two decades
21 Note that we do not consider the 'standard' benefits of unionism in terms of a stronger
voice of workers on the plant level and in the political process that may lead to higher
productivity on the job and lower labour turnover (see Freeman, Medoff [1984] applying
ideas on voice vs. exit by Hirschman [1970] to American unionism). For our case, these
benefits are irrelevant because we do not see a plausible reason why^they should have
varied greatly over time (as we argue the costs have) between, say, the early 1920s and
today.
22 Univariate time series tests for the period 1875-1913 show that the log of industrial
employment appears to follow a stochastic trend of order one.- 12-
since the threshold year 1973. For the analysis of the link between long-term trends of
structural change and equilibrium unemployment, the Weimar period is unfortunately too
short and too much overlapped by violent cyclical fluctuations of economic activity, which
had their roots outside the labour market: the relevant time span between the stabilization
programme in late 1923 (following four years of inflationary chaos at full employment) and
the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 covers just one business cycle with a very sharp
rise and fall of industrial production and employment. If anything, the statistics point towards
an equilibrium unemployment rate that looks higher than in imperial times: in the peak boom
year 1928, 8.4 percent of all union members and roughly 3.8 percent of the labour force were
still unemployed (see Table 1 of the appendix). However, it remains totally unclear to which
rate of unemployment the economy would have converged in the longer run, had there not
been the Great Depression and the subsequent rise of the Nazi command economy. Hence,
while the labour market in Weimar times raises a host of interesting historical issues,23 it
does hardly add much insight to the questions at hand.
(c) The 'good-weather' period 1948-1973
The two and a half decades that followed the West German currency reform of 1948 brought
a somewhat late, but almost perfect vindication of the positive economic scenario that
provides the economic rationale for the institutional innovations of the 1920s. Due to the
post-war influx of roughly ten million ethnic German refugees from Eastern Europe, the
German economy started off with an unemployment rate of 8-10 percent in 1949/50; within
ten years, however, the rate came down to 1 percent (and below) where it stayed until 1973,
with just one very brief interruption in the recession year 1967 when it temporarily peaked at
an annual average of around 2(!) percent.
In terms of structural change, the first half of the period can be regarded as a straight
continuation and a final conclusion of the industrial growth that had been the hallmark of
imperial times. With some minor qualifications, all of what has been said above about
'voluntary' sectoral shifts of workers in imperial times equally applies to the 1950s. Again,
income elasticities of product demand, technical progress and above all a newly emerging
There is in particular the important hypothesis put forward by Borchardt [1979] and
James [1986] and contested by Balderston [1993] that the Weimar economy suffered
from some inherent weaknesses (including uncooperative unions) which damaged its
international competitiveness and made it particularly vulnerable to severe cyclical
shocks like the subsequent Great Depression. For an evaluation of this controversy with a
view to the labour market, see Paque [1994a], pp. 39-52._ 13 . ty H 4LP f S<W8 3D BS SV
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pattern of international trade - this time driven by the fast growing intra-industrial division of
labour within the nascent European Community - allowed a further forceful expansion of
employment in virtually all branches of manufacturing, with high-productivity investment
goods branches like mechanical and electrical engineering, metal manufacturing and most of
all the production of vehicles standing out in terms of output and employment expansion.
Again, agricultural workers - in 1950 still roughly one quarter of the total labour force - stood
ready to accept relatively well-paid industrial jobs on offer, and so did the unemployed, many
of them highly mobile refugees, who were crowded in the agrarian north of the country but, if
required, quite easily moved to the growing industrial heartlands of western and southern
Germany. 24
In these circumstances of fast industrial expansion, the institutions of collective bargaining
and unemployment insurance were likely to have the positive effects described above. There
can hardly be any doubt that the growth performance repeatedly surpassed prior expectations
so that former outsiders could be enfranchised and subsequently exert a moderating influence
on wage growth;25 collective bargaining thus helped to move the labour market to a state of
'overfull employment' which might have been beyond reach under free market conditions.
Besides, the unemployment insurance system is likely to have worked smoothly in the
envisaged sense of allowing an efficient reallocation of labour from low- to high-productivity
uses, simply because the incentive for overlong search activity remained small in view of the
emerging high-wage job options.
The second half of the period- from the early 1960s to 1973 - 'conserved' the state of the
labour market reached by the late 1950s. With industrial employment staying roughly
constant and the domestic labour force shrinking due to demographic reasons, the decline of
agricultural employment could rather easily be accomodated. Even more than that: given the
persisjtent state of overfull employment, foreign workers took over the role of a
supplementary labour force to fill industrial job slots, now mainly in the lower qualification
segments which were left open by upwardly mobile domestic workers. Given the large and
cyclically variable wage drift as well as the elasticity of the labour force gained through the
cyclical buffer stock
1 of foreign workers, the German labour market of the 1960s had
For a detailed account of structural change in the West German economy of the 1950s,
see Giersch, Paque, Schmieding [1992], Section 3.A. and Paque [1994a], pp. 31-33 with
details on the intra-industry pattern of growth.
On the link between non-anticipated positive shocks and the actual decline of real unit
labour costs in the 1950s, see Paque [1994a], pp. 34-7.- 14-
probably the maximum of flexibility that can realistically be achieved within the constraints
of aacollective bargaining system.26
(d) The *bad weather' period since the mid-1970s
In the last two decades, the state of the western German labour market has changed decisively
and lastingly to the worse: from an average share of unemployment in the total labour force
of 0.9 per cent in 1960-74 to 3.4 per cent in 1975-81 and 5.4 percent in 1982-93, and with no
realistic prospect of any significant improvement in the years to come. At no time in the last
twelve years did the unemployment rate fall below 4 percent, not even towards the end of the
very powerful unification boom in 1991, when it reached 4.2 per cent - way above the boom
time levels of the 1960s, though still relatively low by the contemporaneous standards of most
other European countries.27 Historically, the last two decades are by far the longest period of
unemployment ever experienced in Germany; if the short and erratic record of the 1920s is
excluded from consideration, they are in fact the only period in German history of persistent
non-cyclical unemployment.
Much has been written about the actual reasons for the stepwise rise of unemployment and its
subsequent persistence.28 There is now general agreement that, after two major recessions
that followed severe supply-side shocks, the labour markets in most western European
countries dualized: part of the previously laid-off labour force soon found its way back into
employment, a smaller part remained as a kind of sediment of long-term unemployment that
lacked the (potential) productivity to be re-integrated at the then prevailing wage level.
Matters of controversy were the deeper reasons for the dualization: some identified wage
setting as the culprit, because it was insider-oriented on the part of the unions and/or
efficiency wage-oriented on the side of the employers, others regarded a skill atrophy or
26 For a more detailed account of the West German labour market in the 1960s, see Giersch,
Paque, Schmieding [1992], pp. 126-39. Note that the period 1960-73 has a major
unsolved puzzle to offer: while the long persistence of the state of overfull employment
may still be explained with positive 'ratchet-effects' within insider/outsider models, the
sudden and extremely sharp wage increases in and after 1970 remain a mystery, which no
econom(etr)ic model could so far account for in a convincing fashion.
27 Note, however, that most of these countries had higher unemployment rates than
Germany in the 1960s as well so that the extent of the relative worsening over time is in
fact quite similar (see Table 1 in the appendix).
28 See footnote 9 above.- 15-
decline of motivation of the outsiders in the course of the unemployment spell as the decisive
factor. 29
At least for the case of West Germany, both theories of dualization run into some difficulties.
The insider- and efficiency wage setting does not square nicely with the fact that, by histori-
cal standards, the decade since 1983 has not been a period either of poor employment growth
or one of a rise of labour costs: in the period 1983-93, employment grew at an annual rate of
1 per cent, faster than at any time since the 1950s, creating a total of almost 3 million new
jobs and thus allowing the rapid integration of the 'baby-boom
1 generation and of many
immigrants from eastern Europe; and aggregate real labour costs (however measured)
declined slowly and continuously from 1983 until the onset of the forceful unification boom
in 1990, just as they did for the last time in the 1950s.30 In turn, skill atrophy (or the like) in
the course of the unemployment spell raises the question why it could not be observed in a
period with a similar labour market disequilibrium: while long-term unemployment has been
undoubtedly high since the mid-1980s, it had been even higher in the early 1950s, but at that
time, it did not lead to a permanent dualization of the labour market.^1 Apparently, there is
something missing in both theories which helps to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad'
outsiders.
Once again, the key to the puzzle may lie in the trend change of industrial employment: in the
first half of the last two decades (1973-83), industrial employment shrank - with two million
industrial jobs lost, in the second half (1983-93), it stagnated, though its share in the eco-
nomy-wide total continued to decline; in turn, employment in trade and services grew at a
fairly constant trend rate all throughout the two decades. Hence, while the brunt of the job
losses in the first half hit industrial workers disproportionately, the subsequent employment
growth took place exclusively in service sectors. If industry is on average the sector that pays
the highest 'premium' on physical work, this structural change meant a devaluation of the
29 The former standpoint is taken, e.g., by Lindbeck [1993], the latter by Layard, Nickell,
Jackman [1991]. Note, however, that both sides would certainly concede that there is
some truth in both views.
30 See Paque [mimeo], pp. 12-33.
31 In September 1953, when the only special survey on long-term unemployment in the
early post-war period was held in West Germany, 32.3 percent of all jobless men and
22.4 per cent of all jobless women were unemployed for at least two years; since the mid-
1980s, the corresponding figures are 15-18 percent for men and 14-16 percent for
women. Sec Paque [mimeo], p. 66.-16-
raarket value of unskilled labour and of everything in workers' skills that is sector-specific to
industry. If, in addition, there was a trend towards 'servicification' in industry itself - meaning
that physical routine work is replaced by machine activity, which is supervised and serviced
by a smaller number of better-skilled workers - then the respective devaluation becomes even
more dramatic. Data on changes of employment disaggregated by skill levels and branches of
economic activity strongly support the view that structural change in the last two decades has
gone in these directions.32
Given these trends, there are likely to be 'good' outsiders and "bad' outsiders. The good ones
are typically those who have an up-to-date vocational qualification or training, preferably in a
professional service job, who are newcomers (and thus do not yet carry the 'scars' of industrial
work), and who can be expected to adjust flexibly and with high motivation to the new
working environment Obviously, young labour market entrants - notably the many who have
successfully finished an apprenticeship of two to four years - are at a clear advantage in these
respects. Also, the immigrants of the late 1980s, who mainly came from eastern Europe, were
still relatively good candidates. In turn, former industrial workers are at a competitive
disadvantage, in particular when they are older or physically handicapped or have no formal
qualification.'In addition, they tend to have higher reservation wagesjbecause they held a |
rather well-paid industrial job before and because they are granted more generous support by
the unemployment insurance, which makes notably the duration of benefit payments depend
onthe accumulated length of all prior spells of employment.33
By and large, the structural statistics of unemployment in West Germany over the last two
decades strongly confirm this picture: as far as the required data is available, it shows for the
relevant period that unemployment, notably long-term unemployment, has been increasingly
concentrated i.a. on unskilled (versus skilled) labour, on wage workers (versus salaried
employees) and on persons who are older or physically handicapped. 34 in fact, by the early
1990s, about 80 percent of all long-term unemployed persons had an age above 55, a physical
handicap and/or no vocational qualification.35
3
2 See Paque [1994b], pp. 197-8 (notably Tab. 45).
33 See below in Section 3.
3
4 See for statistical details Paque [1994b], pp. 204-13.
35 See Paque [mimeo], P. 143a, Table 3.16 based on unpublished data provided by the
Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit.- 17-
In general, these trends in the labour market did apparently not lead to a corresponding wage
differentiation that might have eased the re-integration of the disadvantaged outsiders: as far
as there is wage data disaggregated by the relevant structural characteristics, it indicates a
high degree of structural rigidity over the last two decades. In particular, there has not been
any widening of the wage difference between high-skill and low-skill workers as it could be
observed in the United States. 36 The reason for this high degree of structural wage rigidity is
very likely to be found in collective bargaining, combined with a rather generous system of
unemployment benefits. With structural change drastically devaluing the human capital of
one part of the economy's outsiders, there is little incentive for the bargaining cartel to
sacrifice insider interests and allow for a substantial wage differentiation to the disadvantage
of those insiders with similar characteristics as the relevant outsiders (e.g. unskilled and/or
older workers). This is all the more so because the unemployment insurance system is
constructed so-as. to allow long periods of low-intensity job search.37
(e) Will the 'weather' improve again?
If one searches for the deeper 'exogenous' reasons for the drastic devaluation of unskilled
labour in West Germany and other industrial countries over the last two decades, two major
forces come to mind: globalization and technological progress. The former means that a
growing group of newly industrialized and developing countries reached a level of
industrialization, technical standards and labour skills that made them successfully compete in
the markets for labour- and (physical) capital-intensive production and increasingly also in
the lower market segments of human-capital intensive goods. The latter means that
technological progress in industry has been labour-saving in the sense that it remained
persistently profitable to replace manpower by modern (physical) capital equipment. Which
of the two forces dominated is a matter of dispute,^ which appears to be most relevant for
some major issues of trade policy vis-a-vis the Third World, but much less so for a
speculative assessment of future trends in the labour market. After all, the speed and the
36; See, on basis of different data sets, OECD [1993] for the 1980s, and Paque [1994b], p.
204-214 for the last two decades.
37 For crucial details of the system, see Section 3 below.
38 See the antagonistic views of Wood [1994], who regards the increasing North/South-trade
as decisive, and Freeman [1994] (as quoted in The Economist of April 2, 1994) , who
holds that the driving force must have been technological change because, in the western
countries, the import share of developing and newly industrialized countries is still too
small to explain any dramatic effect on the labour market.-18-
shape of technological progress is itself to a large extent the (endogenous) outcome of a
competitive race on all levels - encompassing growing intra-industry trade within and
between industrial countries as well as growing inter-industry trade between industrial and
developing countries. Hence the process of globalization in a broader sense - meaning the
world-wide trend towards the integration of product and service markets, which in turn is
fuelled by the (technology-induced) decline of transportation and communication costs - may
well be the right driving force to be identified behind the secular changes in virtually all
labour markets of western industrial countries.
For the future, it is hard to imagine a change or a significant slowdown of this trend towards
globalization in the broadest sense, not least because major population giants of the Third
World - notably China and India - are now embarking on the way that a few much smaller
Asian countries have gone through during the last three decades. Hence, if anything, the
process is likely to speed up and will further accentuate structural change in the rich
countries: industrial employment will continue to shrink notably in terms of low-skill jobs,
service employment - in the upper 'professional' segment and in the lower 'low-productivity'
segment- will tend to grow.^9 For former industrial workers, the upper segment will in
''general be beyond reach and the lower segment will be unattractive.
In this sense, the long historical period of 'voluntary' structural change, which involved the
growth of a sector with high wages of unskilled labour and thus an almost automatic trend
towards more equality of incomes, may have come to an end some time by the 1970s. For a
country like Germany this has quite dramatic consequences for the viability of its labour
market institutions: while there is a permanent improvement of the quality of its labour force
through a 'generational exchange' -older, on average less skilled workers leaving and
younger, on average better skilled ones entering the labour force - there seems to be no
safeguard in the system to make sure that this 'natural' adjustment proceeds fast enough to
avoid extended phases of high search (or better: structural) unemployment.
For this kind of external conditions, collective bargaining and the welfare state German style
do not appear to be well equipped: as the viability of a pay-as-you-go system of old age
insurance crucially depends on whether the population is growing or shrinking, so the
39 There is also an 'industry-close' middle segment of services like transportation and
wholesale trade, which is similar to industry in terms of the skill intensity of work and the
level of wages. Unfortunately, it is also that part of the service sector that tends to shrink
or at least stagnate.-19-
viability of 'egalitarian' collective bargaining combined with generous welfare state pro-
visions crucially depends on whether structural change has by itself egalitarian implications
or not. If not - and provided the problem of chronic unemployment is to be seriously tackled -
some major reforms of the 'German model' should be unavoidable.
3. Some Guidelines for Reform of the 'German Model'
From the analysis above, it follows that a return to full employment in (western) Germany as
probably in many countries of the European Union would require a quite substantial re-
duction of the unit labour cost that firms have to incur when hiring formerly unemployed and
a fortiori long-term unemployed persons. In principle, there are two non-exclusive ways to
approach this intermediate aim: (a) raising the potential labour productivity and (b) lowering
the prospective wage of the idle workforce.
(a) Raising labour productivity
Once there is persistent unemployment, a policy of improving the potential productivity of
jobless persons is basically constrained to the use of two instruments: (re-)qualification
measures and work-creation schemes. Since the early 1980s, both instruments have been used
quite extensively in western Germany. In the most recent seven-year period 1987-93, an
annual average of 170,000 unemployed persons participated in measures of (re)qualification
and almost 100,000 in work-creation schemes so that, arithmetically, almost every seventh
unemployed person at any point in time was matched by one person in any of these
programmes.^
It is extremely difficult to evaluate these programmes in terms of their costs and benefits
because the lack of appropriate control groups prohibits any precise estimate of by how much
the likelihood of an unemployed person to find a job is increased through the programme
participation. So far, the available empirical evidence is far from unambiguous, but it does
point in the direction that the programmes improve the re-integration chances, though
40 Own calculations based on data published in Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit [various issues].
After German unification, both types of programmes were used even more extensively in
the eastern part of the country where, in the peak year 1992, more than 800,000 persons
were either participating in (re)qualification or in work-creation schemes while 1.2
million were unemployed.-20-
possibly only by a relatively small margin.
4
1 Whether this justifies the cost of publicly
organizing or subsidizing the private organisation of the programmes - on top of paying
unemployment benefits - remains a completely open question.
In any case, the programmes are by construction no good candidates to solve a large-scale
unemployment problem resulting from structural change: usually, they can only provide new
qualifications 'in the neighbourhood' of old skills so that a large part of the structural
deficiencies of long-term unemployed persons - complete lack of skills and formal education,
physical handicaps and and above all age - remains untouched. In a way, it is precisely these
deficiencies which limit the scope for (re)qualification in the first place so that labour market
programmes remain typically focused on the more flexible part of an economy's stock of
underutilized manpower and human capital. In fact, the basic rationale of (re)qualification has
always been to smooth the intra-industry adjustment of workers from one job to another - a





In a country like Germany where wage setting is dominated by collective bargaining, the
change in the wage level and structure that would be required to achieve a permanent
reduction of unemployment should ideally be initiated by unions and employers associations
at the bargaining table. As argued above, however, the experience of the last two decades has
shown that the dominance of insider interests generally prevents the long-term victims of
structural change from having any significant influence on the bargaining outcome. Given the
group rationality of the behaviour both of unions and of employers' associations in terms of
insider/outsider- and efficiency wage considerations, there is no obvious way how the
41 See Hofbauer; Dadzio [1987] and Kasparek, Koop [1991] on (re)qualification measures
and Schmid, Krommelbein, Klems, Gafi [1993] on work-creation schemes.
4
2 This is also the author's interpretation of the Swedish labour market programmes: these
programmes were successful as long as there still was enough job creation in industry due
above all to the hefty two-step devaluations in the early 1980s, a classical case of beggar-
thy-neighbour demand policy, which cut Sweden off from the continental recession-cum-
industrial shrinkage. However, with the unemployment rate now being in the range of 8-9
percent and no macroeconomic 'emergency exit' available, the labour market programmes
appear to be hopelessly overburdened as a prime policy instrument to restore full
employment. For a similar view, see Lindbeck [mimeo].-21-
outcome could be affected by macroeconomic policy.^ Therefore, apart from moral suasion
which also has obvious limits
44, the only major policy options available are changes in the
institutional background against which collective bargaining operates.
In essence, this background consists of two major elements, the labour market constitution
and the unemployment benefit system. As to the labour market constitution, a necessary step
would have to be the removal of all legal or political obstacles against the working of outsider
competition vis-a-vis the collective bargaining cartel. In particular, this would mean that the
option of declaring a collective agreement 'generally binding' should once and for all be
closed to the government - at best by simply repealing the relevant legal rule (§ 5 Tarifver-
tragsgesetz). This is a necessary condition to save future outsider competition from being
strangled by government action on behalf of insider interests; however, it is by no means a
sufficient condition to create this competition as some construction principles of the welfare
state stand in its way (see below). At present, the rule is used very seldom, apparently because
outsider competition is no powerful threat to collective agreements anyway.
43 Some early proponents of the hysteresis view of European unemployment made at the
time a strong plea for engineering a non-anticipated macroeconomic demand expansion
to 'enfranchise' the outsiders (see, i.a., Blinder [1988]). However, if our interpretation is
correct that the remaining 'hard core
1 of non-cyclical unemployment is the long-term
consequence of structural change, not just of cyclical bad luck, such an expansion would
be useless, if not counterproductive.
4
4 In Germany, moral suasion has a long tradition going back to the so-called calls for
moderation regularly issued by the first minister of economics Ludwig Erhard in the
1950s and later institutionalized in the 'concerted action' of government, employers and
unions in the later 1960s and the early 1970s. At its best, the concerted action succeeded
in tying up package deals of short-run macroeconomic policy shifts and wage moderation
which helped for stabilization purposes; the boon to the unions of participating in the
concerted action consisted of representing themselves as an essential, reliable and
responsible (political) partner in a successful macroeconomic operation. This benefit
could be expected to accrue in the short run - usually within no more than one phase of
the business cycle - and to be politically well visible in a general public that was very
open to ideas of demand management. (For details, see Giersch, Paque, Schmieding
[1992], pp. 139-54.) In today's fight against long-term unemployment, there are no such
benefits for the unions: the fruits of the fight concern a fringe group of society and they
will accrue only after a prolonged adjustment process which tends to blur the link
between the unions' goodwill and the outcome in the eyes of pubic. Hence the incentives
for the union leadership to sacrifice membership interests for the uncertain and remote
political benefit of a 'compact for wage flexibility and employment' are likely to be
minimal.-22-
In any case, the core of the reform would have to tackle the unemployment benefit system.
To understand the practice and consequences of the current system and thus the starting-point
for reform, some institutional details are indispensable; they concern above all replacement
ratios, replacement periods and rules of job acceptability.
At present, the system provides a so-called unemployment money (Arbeitslosengeld) on a
contribution-financed insurance basis as 60 percent of the terminal net wage (67 percent for
persons with at least one child) for roughly 1-2.3 years, depending on age and length of prior
employment.45 When the unemployment money phases out, it is replaced by the so-called
unemployment aid (Arbeitslosenhilfe) to be granted for the remaining - possibly indefinite -
spell of unemployment on a means-tested basis as 53 percent of the terminal net wage (57
percent to persons with at least one child),46 with a lower plafond implicitly defined by
standard supplementary welfare payments (Sozialhilfe) granted also on a means-tested basis
to persons not registered as unemployed (whether they work or not). In the seven-year period
1987-93, an annual average of one third of all unemployment benefit recipients received
unemployment aid, the other two thirds unemployment money.47 Note that, during the time
of unemployment, any recipient of unemployment support ('money
1 or 'aid') remains a
member of the public system of health, pension and accident insurance, provided he/she was a
member before (which is usually the case); the person's contributions to the system are in part
made by the unemployment insurance, in part simply discontinued, with the benefits
remaining the same as in his/her last spell of employment.48
The legal framework for the rules on 'job acceptability' (Zumutbarkeit) is provided in a
special 'job acceptability order' (Zumutbarkeits-Anordnung), which is of great practical
45 These replacement ratios apply since the beginning of this year. Until 1993, the relevant
ratios were 63 and 68 percent respectively. Special rules apply to persons with very short
periods of prior employment. For details, see Arbeitsforderungsgesetz (AFG), § 106.
46 For details, see Arbeitsforderungsgesetz (AFG), § 136. Until 1993, the relevant replace-
ment ratios were 56 and 58 percent respectively
47 Own calculations based on data published in Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit [various issues].
By comparison, the numbers for the low-unemployment seven-year period 1967-73 are
14 percent unemployment aid and 86 percent unemployment money, which at that time
was still more strictly limited to one year.
48 See Arbeitsforderungsgesetz (AFG), §§ 155-166 for the (very complicated) details.-23-
importance. In particular, it stipulates
4
9 that a job need not be accepted by an unemployed
person
— if the wage is (i) below the level fixed in collective agreements or commonly practised in
the relevant region for this type of work, or (ii) below the level of the unemployment aid
he/she receives, or (iii) below the level of the unemployment money he/she receives
unless this is unusually high by the standard of the relevant region in which case this
standard applies, or
— if taking the job would significantly worsen his/her chances to return to a job identical or
similar to the one he/she held before becoming unemployed, or
— if the level of qualification required for the job is significantly below the level of quali-
fication for the job he/she held before becoming unemployed, with the criteria for an un-
acceptable 'downgrading' of the person slowly and gradually tightening with the length of
the unemployment spell, or
— if the geographical location of the workplace is not within an acceptable distance from
home, with a commuter time of 150 minutes (round-trip) being the standard maximum of
acceptability for a full-time job.
By all common sense standards, this unemployment benefit system - as defined by its
replacement ratios, the time spans for which benefits are granted, and the various criteria of
acceptability - is very generous. Economically, it is almost tailor-made to invite to extended
job searches, notably in those cases where an unemployed person has been for a longer period
of time a (well-paid) industrial worker who has relatively little chance to find a comparative
job in due course. While his manpower may be drastically devalued due to the shrinkage of
industry, he finds his standing in the queue at the gates of the high-productivity sector highly
subsidized first by the working population and then by the taxpayer. Even if indefinitely
unsuccessful in his search, he will receive unemployment aid of at least 53 percent of his
terminal wage provided he passes the means test, which he will usually do because the
definition of 'need' is in practice invariably tied to his prior living standard that is typically
linked to the relatively high wage he received before for an extended period of time. In no
circumstances can he be forced to accept low-productivity service jobs that fall under the
53 (57) per cent threshold of his historical wage, which thus defines the long-term lower limit
of his reservation wage; and even if the prospective wage is higher, the job may be
unacceptable for one of the other broadly defined reasons. As a consequence, the growth of a
4
9 See Arbeitsfdrderungsgesetz (AFG), pp. 342-347, Zumutbarkeits-Anordnung, §§ 2 II, 3,
4, 51,61, 8-12 /.all with further legal details.-24-
low-productivity service sector is severely hampered: as many job offers in the lower wage
segment can simply be disregarded by a large part of the unemployed, no such offers will be
made by rational employers so that a whole potential segment of the economy (well-known in
the United States) remains non-existent or relatively small.
For collective bargaining, the system as it stands has two straight ramifications. First - and
quite obviously- the induced low search intensity of the unemployed reduces outsider
competition from the labour supply side. Second, the rule that unemployed persons need not
accept a job offered by any firm at a wage below the contractual minimum narrows the
effectively available labour supply for non-organized employers, thus checking the outsider
threat from the labour demand side as well. Hence the unemployment insurance system
provides strong indirect support to the wage cartel, thus impeding the necessary reorientation
of bargaining outcomes.
How could the system sensibly bejeformed to reduce the incentives for overextended job
search without undermining the philosophy of the 'German Model' or, for that matter, the
"European Model'^O of the welfare state? If one of the core principles of this philosophy can
be seen in providing all citizens who have lost their job with a minimum of subsistence that is
not intolerably far below their prior standard of living, then a kind of minimalist reform of
the German system may take about the following shape.
As ever, unemployed persons receive contribution-financed 'unemployment money', with
replacement ratios as they prevail in the present system, though preferably for a somewhat
shorter period of time ranging, say, from 9 to 15 months depending (as now) primarily on the
age of the person. For this first stage of unemployment, the criteria of acceptability remain
the same as in the present system, i.e. the unemployed person is still free to search exclusively
'in the neighbourhood' of his/her prior wage and working conditions and to turn down any
offers of jobs with substantially inferior characteristics. If still unemployed after the first
stage (i.e. 9-15 months), the person is entitled to receive tax-financed 'unemployment aid',
again with today's replacement ratios applying. In this second stage of unemployment,
however, the person is not entitled anymore to turn down any emerging job offer at whatever
wage or working conditions, provided he/she is physically able to do the job. On the other
hand, he/she is entitled to receive financial compensation for any net income loss incurred by
taking a job: if the wage of the job is below the level of unemployment aid he/she obtains at
the time of the offer, the person receives a governmentWtfc/img grant Shat makes up the
\ 1
50 See Emerson [1988].-25-
/ difference, preferably even somewhat more to give the person a stronger incentive to include
I lower wage jobs into his/her range of search. The rationale of this matching grant is basically
the same as the idea of various employment subsidy schemes that have recently been put
forward^! jf ^ philosophy of the welfare state requires that part of the devaluation of
manpower and human capital in the course of structural change is to be socialized, then it
should be done by subsidizing states of employment and not states of (long-term) unem-
ployment. 52
Subsidizing a relatively small part of total employment is somewhat more complicated than
providing benefits to a well-defined group of registered unemployed persons. Four issues
deserve particular attention: [i] the time horizon of employment subsidization and its costs,
[ii] the lack of incentives for job change within the low-wage segment of the labour market,
[iii] the potential for a joint misuse by employer and (prospective) employee, and [iv] the
basis for assessing future unemployment benefits and old-age pensions.
Ad [i]: To be a valuable instrument to create a market for low-productivity labour on unlimi-
ted contracts, it is important that the matching'grant be also given for a long, preferably an
of time. On first glance, this seems to imply an unbearable burden for the
51 See, i.a., Phelps [1994], Snower [1994].
52 Note that, to a very limited extent, there already exist employment subsidy schemes in
Germany. Within the general framework of labour market programmes, employment
subsidies may be granted to firms for hiring long-term unemployed persons of age above
55 years on an unlimited contract basis. If granted, the subsidies usually amount to 50
percent of the relevant contractual minimum wage; they are paid for a maximum of three
years, with the rate of subsidization declining to 40 percent in the second and 30 percent
in the third year. Under very restrictively defined circumstances, the subsidy may even be
higher and paid for a longer period of time. (For details, see Arbeitsforderungsgesetz
(AFG), §§ 97-99.) Although no empirical assessment of the working of this rule is so far
available, the general impression is that it played only a marginal part and did not mean a
significant step in the direction of labour cost differentiation. The reasons are probably
twofold. First, the subsidy is granted only for a fixed term, which may not be enough to
compensate the employer for the disadvantage of being committed in the longer run to a
worker with bad structural characteristics. Second, the subsidy has the character of an ad-
hoc offer to firms that the job centres make for a particular person if funds are available,
not of a reliable rule that signals potential employers a once for all change of the costs of
this particular type of labour. - Besides this scheme, employment subsidies are only paid
to commercial firms (i) for jobs whose output is in the public interest (Arbeits-
forderungsgesetz (AFG), §§ 91 96), which in practice rarely happens; (ii) for on-the-job
training of labour market fringe groups (FdA-Anordnung, §§ 19-23).-26-
government budget because the average length of a (subsidized) employment spell of a
formerly long-term unemployed person should be many times longer than the average
remaining spell of (fully financed) unemployment that the person would have otherwise spent
in unemployment; what the government saves in unemployment aid would thus be vastly
overcompensated by what he has to spend on matching grants. However, on second glance,
this seemingly plausible argument is largely unfounded because it neglects the incentive to
accept a high-wage job - i.e. a job with a wage above the critical threshold of unemployment
aid - that should work equally in both systems: each (unsubsidized) job that is attractive
enough to leave the state of long-term unemployment is also attractive enough to leave the
state of (subsidized) employment because, by construction of the subsidization, the reserva-
tion wage of the same person is likely to be the same in both worlds. Only if one were to
introduce implausibly high costs of changing jobs compared to taking up a job after a spell of
unemployment (or some other 'biased' assumption)^ could the above argument claim more
than prima facie plausibility. Hence, if anything, the matching grant scheme is likely to be the
fiscally cheaper system because, at roughly the same number of government subsidy
recipients, the matching grant per person is lower than the respective unemployment aid.
Ad [ii]: Nevertheless, the matching grant system has a labour allocation problem of its own
within the newly created segment of low-wage labour, i.e. of labour paid less than the unem-
ployment aid threshold. Competition for low-wage labour may drive up its market wage and
thus open up better-paid, but still low-wage job slots not only for the still long-term
unemployed, who have no free choice anyway, but also for those already employed and
receiving a matching grant; however, these have no pecuniary incentive to change jobs or to
bid for higher pay on the plant level, at least as long as the market wage on offer does not rise
above the wage plus matching grant that they currently receive. In fact, the market only
'works' from the labour demand, not from the labour supply side; and there is no way how the
market could by itself make the subsidy burden shrink.
There are basically two potential (non-exclusive) ways out of this problem. The first and
probably most fool-proof way is to make the paying of the matching grant contingent upon
the readiness of the subsidized employee to accept any better-paid job (and conversely to
For example the assumption that the search intensity of long-term unemployed persons is
higher than that of an already employed person receiving the same net income so that the
latter is less likely to 'notice' the emerging better-paid job opening. Given the notoriously
low search intensity that could be empirically observed for long-term unemployed
persons in the past, this assumption is very implausible indeed.-27-
reject any worse-paid job) or alternatively to negotiate a higher wage with the current
employer. Practically, this could be done by leaving the subsidized employees registered at
the public job centres, subjecting them to an analogous code of acceptability as the
unemployed, and possibly authorizing private commercial employment agencies - since
recently not prohibited anymore in Germany - to watch the labour market for superior low-
wage job alternatives open to the subsidized employees. The second way would be to give
low-wage employees a stronger search incentive, e.g., by reducing the matching grant by less
than the realized wage gain. However, such a strategy has its natural limits because it also
gives some 'perverse' incentives: it would become attractive to deliberately start with the
worst-paid job and then move up by job changes so as to 'privatize' part of the self-created
potential for social gains; and after such a 'privatization
1, there would also be an unwelcome
incentive to stay in the range of subidized employment instead of searching for unsubsidized
jobs above the unemployment-aid threshold. This is why the private gains would have to
remain within reasonably narrow bounds and allowed to accrue only for a very limited period
of time, say, a few months after a job change.
Ad [iii]: There is the possibility of a cartelization of potential employer and employee at the
expense of the government: in private arrangements, they may agree to set the wage below
the person's marginal product so as to maximize the share of the person's income that is
covered by the matching grant. Again, the remedy lies in the competitive bidding for low
wage labour from the demand side: if, for whatever reason, an employer/employee-cartel sets
the wage well below the market level, then it is very likely that better-paid job offers for the
respective employee will emerge in due course and push the wage up again, thus leading back
to the solvable problem of making subsidized labour move from worse to better paid jobs (see
[ii] above).
Similarly, it has been argued - and allegedly supported by empirical evidence - that there tend
to be large deadweight losses involved in employment subsidy schemes because, typically, a
large part of all employers who cash in subsidies for hiring long-term unemployed persons
would have hired them anyway; in the same vein, there is supposed to be a strong substitution
effect in the sense that employers have an incentive to replace unsubsidized workers by subsi-
dized ones, thus in effect reducing labour costs at the expense of the taxpayer without
inreasing employment. 54 Even if one were to accept this empirical evidence, which is mostly
based on rather small-scale case studies with many conceptual problems, it is hard to see how
See the survey on various empirical studies of employment subsidy schemes in OECD
[1993], pp.63-4; see also The Economist of July, 16 and August 20, 1994.-28-
the mischief could be more than a short-run problem within our matching grant system: if, as
the evidence seems to suggest, long-term unemployed persons are after all relatively good
substitutes for employed workers, then competitive pressures will push up their wages in the
way described above and thus reduce the extent of subsidization.
Ad [iv]: A technical problem with economic significance is the question on what basis future
unemployment benefits (and also pension rights) should be calculated if a person spends part
of his working life in subsidized low-wage employment. Currently, all future claims against
the social security system are kept at the level defined by the terminal gross income, no
matter how long the unemployment spell; depending on the particular characteristics of the
case, the cost of this generous rule is borne by different communities of insured people or by
the taxpayer. If one wants to continue this practice within the matching grant system, one
would simply have to supplement the matching grants by social security payments that just
ensure that the person concerned can keep his/her prior level of entitlements. Economically,
however, this may lead to odd situations notably for the unemployment insurance system
because it would imply an absurdly, high replacement ratio for persons laid off from
subsidized low-wage employment.55 Hence some phasing out of the 'historical' value of the
demands on the social security system will have to be made, with a wide array of possible
models ranging from a gradual downward adjustment to the immediate sharp fall of contri-
butions and future claims down to a level that corresponds to the low wage. Incidentally, this
would also re-establish some incentive for the employee to be hired at the highest possible
wage because, in the end, this wage will be important for his/her future claims against the
social security system, notably his/her pension after retirement.
55 E.g., a person with at least one child would still receive unemployment money to the
amount of 67 percent of his/her 'historical' net wage, i.e. about 15 percent more than
his/her now terminal net income (wage plus matching grant).-29-
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Source: 1920-38, 1950-89 Maddison (1991), pp. 262-5, Table C.6; 1990-93 OECD Economic Outlook (various issues); *preliminary.